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NEW BELGRADE AFTER 1999: 
SPATIAL VIOLENCE AS DE-SOCIALISATION, DE-ROMANISATION AND DE-HISTORISATION 
 




New Belgrade after 1999 is associated with the transition from a socialist and single-party 
state to a consumer capitalist and multi-party system, with the latter perceived as an 
indicator of democracy. This paper asks if and how this transitional period points to 
NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign still being in-operation through spatial violence by other 
means, with these means related to the negation of difference and the transformation of 
everyday life and social values. Might this spatial violence be even more coercive than that 
of the war as it manifests through the convergence of military, legal, governmental and 
economic entities of international “redevelopment” agencies working in the name of 
“security” along with the Serbian government? This paper explores this proposition by 
focusing on the post-1999 transformation and re-modernisation of New Belgrade as an 
elimination of difference through processes of de-socialisation, de-Romanisation and de-





This paper will explore urban transformations in Belgrade occurring in the aftermath of the 1999 
Operation Allied Force (March 24 – June 10). These transformations will be framed as obliterations of 
alternative approaches to ways of living and to communal social values through processes of de-
socialisation, de-Romanisation and de-historisation. The vehicle for the exploration will be New Belgrade 
in general, and Block 67 and the ‘Old Fairground’ (Blocks 17 and 18) in particular (refer to Figure 01). 
 
The paper will firstly trace various shifts in the urban planning of New Belgrade. Examining various 
urban plans in relation to the political period when they emerged will allow re-evaluation of both distant 
and more immediate histories in order to expose recent spatial violence associated with neo-liberal 
privatisation. This investigation will be driven by three key ideas. The first is that the change from 
social(ist) to consumer values is associated with a violent elimination of social solidarity and diverse 
approaches to living. The second is that supposedly civilised ways of living were advanced by the 
violent expunging of Romani settlements in New Belgrade. The third is that the elimination of historical 
traces from the urban landscape negates the imbrication of space and violence.  
 
This text will therefore explore the proposition that de-socialisation, de-Romanisation and de-
historisation are intrinsically and cyclically linked through spatial violence. Here, de-historisation might 
be understood to extend beyond negation of the violent history of particular urban sites to the erasure of 
socialist symbols through the renaming of streets and buildings and the changes in their appearance. De-
socialisation might be understood to be associated not only with the commodification of residential and 
public space and economic resources, but also with the elimination of all alternative social and urban 
values such as those associated with Romani settlements. Together, these linked processes suggest a 
continuation of spatial violence by means other than the direct military campaign. 
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NEW BELGRADE 
New Belgrade is one of Belgrade’s municipalities. This municipality is important not only because it was 
largely constructed in the wake of WWII (unlike Belgrade’s Old City), but also because its construction 
might be understood as a manifestation of spatial violence, especially the more recent and coercive 
examples of this violence associated with the transition and transformation of Belgrade in the wake of the 
1999 NATO bombing campaign.1  
 
Up until the nineteenth century, the site of New Belgrade was a swamp and a no-man’s land. In military 
terms it was also used as a strategic place from which to launch attacks on Belgrade’s Old City. The 
swamp separated Belgrade’s Old City, which was under the Ottoman rule, from the adjacent town of 
Zemun, which was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The vital characteristic of New Belgrade is its 
physical flatness, posing a sharp contrast to the Old City, which is built on 32 hills. According to the 
architect and academic Ljiljana Blagojevic, since New Belgrade was 
 
[d]evoid of any urban structure, it fulfilled the function of a cordon sanitaire, observed and controlled as a 
no-connection-zone between the Orient, where Belgrade, as it were, marked its end point, and the 
Occident, of which Zemun was the, first, even if modest and marginal, port of call.2 
 
Despite the apparent physical flatness prior to the construction of current day New Belgrade, the fact that 
the area has a history of identification as a border zone – between the Occidental Austro-Hungarian 
Empire / Christendom and the Oriental Ottoman Empire / Islam, Western and Eastern Empires, and 
Roman Catholicism and Orthodox Christendom – exposes the underlying politics of violence that occurs 
when borders are assigned for the purpose of territorial control between an Occident associated with 
civilisation and an Orient associated with barbarism. Against this no-man’s land position and status of 
territories with fixed and antagonistic identities arose the 20th Century imagining of New Belgrade. 
 
 
NEW BELGRADE: ‘The Fairground’ – Block 17 and Block 18   
The erection of New Belgrade began in the mid 1930s in the area that is today colloquially known as ‘The 
Fairground’, and officially as Block 17 and Block 18 (refer to Figure 01). The construction of this zone 
began even though no urban plan was approved despite many being proposed since the 1920s.3 
 
The zone along the left bank of the river Sava (present day Block 18) was the first area to be built-up. It 
was probably chosen for construction of residential houses due to its slight elevation above the level of 
the wetland. Prior to the purchase of 200 hectares by the Yugoslav King Aleksandar in mid 1930s, the 
land was owned by farmers and used to graze sheep. After it was purchased, this area was divided into 
seven linear streets (only six streets exist now), as well as subdivided into two hundred, long, narrow 
parcels, sold to individuals and used for the construction of houses. The parcelisation was a rural 
influenced-system on what was in the process of becoming an urban context. Initial construction on each 
parcel included erection of a small, one-storey house on the edge of a strip and closer to the street, with a 
long garden behind utilised for orchards and vegetable gardens. At the edge of Block 18, in 1983, two 
Romani families settled despite the immediate area in Block 18A used for waste disposal. The Romani 
move from southern Serbia was incited by the economic crisis, spurred by Tito’s death in 1980 and 
increasing interest rates from World Bank loans. Over time, and since 1983, the Romani population grew 
to 173 dwellings and 820 people in 2005.4 The increase in settlement size and population was also due to 
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the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in the 1990s, which signified the disintegration of Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and the 1998-1999 war in Kosovo and Metohija, when 140 new 
families settled between 1998 – 2000.5 The Romani zone expanded from the initial edge of Block 18 
towards the New Railway Bridge (Stari Zeleznicki Most) to the south.  
 
The area once occupied by the middle class has, since the 1980s arrival of the Romani, 1990s influx of 
refugees spurred by the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the mid 1990s hyperinflation in 
Serbia that affected the livelihood of some Belgrade-born population, largely accommodated lower 
classes and the disadvantaged. The change in occupation has also affected the status of land and home 
ownership, meaning that developments in the past 20-30 years have largely remained unregistered and 
illegal. To this day, despite the zone having a central location – it joins New Belgrade with the Old City; it 
is located along the fringe of the river Sava; and, it is in a tight proximity to major traffic routes and 
public transport zones – it has a peripheral and quiet atmosphere. This is largely a result of a green belt 
of trees that sits on a slightly higher terrain between the Sava and the residential zone.  
 
Block 17 (refer to Figure 01), which encompasses the Belgrade Fairground built in 1937 and expanded in 
1938,6 was turned into a concentration camp soon after it was built. It was used by the Nazis during 
WWII to exterminate Romani, Jews and all those Serbs who were openly opposed to the Fascist regime. 
During 1947 – 1950, the Fairground was used as the Headquarters of a construction firm that was in 
charge of building New Belgrade.7 Some of the pavilions also housed volunteer members of the Youth 
Labour Brigades8 – referred to subsequently as the ORA (Omladinska Radna Akcija) – who helped lay eight 
million cubic meters of sand and gravel to set the terrain for New Belgrade’s post WWII construction 
(their role is explored later in this paper). In 1987, the Fairground was placed under a historical 
preservation order. In 1995, a memorial sculpted by Miodrag Popovic was built near the vicinity of the 
1937 Belgrade Fairground to mark the violent extermination of peoples during WWII; while 
commemorating the manifestation of genocide in Belgrade on the Fairground site, the memorial plaque 
also mentions the Serb and Romani victims of the concentration camp in Jasenovac (Croatia), and marks 
the heroism and resistance of all Yugoslav peoples and victims of the Nazi terror (refer to Image 02). It 
has been proposed that the construction of a memorial complex specific to all those exterminated within 
the Fairground, and located within the same grounds, will begin in 2015. 
 
 
NEW BELGRADE: Urban Development of New Belgrade: 1945 – 1990s  
When the urbanisation of the rest of New Belgrade began to accelerate after WWII, development of 
Blocks 17 and 18 started to stagnate. The urbanisation was provisioned by the leadership of the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Head of State Marshal Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav Communist 
Party Politburo of Serbia and the City Party Committee.9 New Belgrade was designed ‘with a strategic 
political intent: to serve as the capital of [what has since the 1963 Constitution become known as] the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.’10 Under Tito, the SFRY was established as a series of multiethnic 
republics, with populations ‘striving to create a balance between Western capitalism and Soviet 
communism.’11 With the SFRY split from Soviet Russia in 1948, Yugoslavia spearheaded the formation of 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. The NAM was conceived as a network of nations that had a 
‘third way’ political geography and offered an alternative to the Cold War politics of the USSR / Warsaw 
Pact and the United States / NATO.12 The SFRY under Titoism had an alternative approach to economics, 
law and the military, and was one of two European countries – the other being Cyprus – that openly 
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opposed Europe’s Eastern and Western Block divisions. Springing from this, urban construction in 
Belgrade was part of a larger political project whose motives were uniquely ideological and 
experimental: the interlacing of Soviet communist social welfare with a planned market economy. The 
economy was decentralised, meaning that autonomy was given to districts, regions and Republics. Land, 
property and institutions were initially state owned, however, with the introduction of self-management 
in the 1950s the vast majority of enterprises became socially owned. In other words, self-management 
and workers’ rights prevailed, and, in theory at least, profit sharing occurred in socially-run enterprises.13 
Travel outside the Yugoslav borders was also permitted, unlike in other Communist countries.  
 
Before any construction could take place after WWII, New Belgrade’s swampy terrain firstly had to be 
drained.14 The area was then evenly covered with landfill and raised above the reach of flooding and the 
underground water table. Sand and gravel were transported from a small island called Little War Island 
(Malo Ratno Ostrvo), almost destroying the island.15 This work was predominantly done the ORA. Up 
until 1990, a year that marked ORA’s last activity, ‘more than two million young Yugoslavs participated 
in these events.’16 After WWII, the ORA became a means of strengthening friendship and solidarity 
among people, as well as spreading Tito’s ideology, helping to re-build the SFRY and providing a base 
from which to ‘combat illiteracy by organizing educational and other courses in the brigades.’17 Between 
1947 and 1950 alone, 100,000 ORA volunteers participated in various labour-intensive activities in New 
Belgrade.18 The ORA was also involved in other projects, such as the construction of the Highway of 
Brotherhood and Unity, the transport route linking Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, Nis and Skopje19 (the 
road is now known as the Boulevard of Arsenija Carnojevica, and since 1999 has become particularly 
significant as it connects to E75 and Pan-European Corridor X which is a significant West-East 
thoroughfare leading to Germany on one end and Turkey on the other end). However, due to the 
immense scale of New Belgrade’s urbanisation, with time, construction work including that carried out 
by the ORA became dependent on World Bank loans from the West.20 The loans helped support the 
SFRY’s split from the USSR in 1948.21 The West hoped that other socialist / communist satellite states 
would follow Yugoslavia’s example. It is said that developments facilitated by grants and loans from the 
West ‘were not confined to “industrialization” in its narrower sense, but were extended to include such 
developments as the creation of tourism industry.’22 In brief, the building of New Belgrade (initially 
conceived as an administration centre) and other Yugoslav industrial and infrastructure zones  
 
rested on a threefold support: (1) ideological: the socialist government was in a position to manage the 
entire country like a vast industrial enterprise; (2) economic: starting from the early 1950s Yugoslavia was 
granted hefty credits from the West; and (3) popular: a considerable part of the work was performed by 
unpaid labor in the form of Voluntary Youth brigades [ORA]. This was a uniquely Yugoslavian invention 
that marked the reconstruction effort after the war and was maintained well into the 1980s as one of the 
crowning examples of the country’s “permanent revolution”.23 
 
With Western loans offered to support the SFRY’s split with the USSR, and as the SFRY experienced 
great housing demand post WWII, the intent (led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Tito, the 
Yugoslav Communist Party Politburo of Serbia and the City Party Committee) that New Belgrade be 
known for its government and cultural buildings was redefined. New Belgrade instead developed a 
residential character. Construction of residential accommodation was accelerated as a result of SFRY’s 
socially owned property system, in which state institutions provided housing for their employees. From 
a legal and social standpoint, a free apartment and social services were considered fundamental rights 
necessary to the wellbeing of society. According to Blagojevic, in 
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New Belgrade, the specificity of the housing function followed the ideological premise that a place of 
residence/apartment in socialism is not only a commodity, but that it is its use value which defines it. It 
reflected another socio-political construct of the right to a residence as a universal right to the common 
public good, and related to the ideal of the just distribution, i.e. the ideal of free apartment, and free social 
services for all.24  
 
The urban plan that allowed such an accelerated construction was devised in the 1950s. This plan 
primarily dealt with the central zone of New Belgrade, and was constituted by nine symmetrical blocks  
(Blocks 21 – 29) whose central axis was composed of three blocks (Block 24, 25, 26) intended for public 
use, and the grand assembly area (refer to Figure 01). The symmetrical blocks fronted the building of the 
Federal Executive Council (1947 – 1961) and were backed by a proposed, yet never built, railway station. 
The Plan closely followed principles of Le Corbusier’s Radiant City and Brasilia from the Athens 
Charter.27 However, with residential buildings taking precedence construction of the central axis was 
halted. New Belgrade was filled with block-type buildings, which were seen as a highly efficient solution 
to the great housing demand.25 The orthogonal blocks were planned with hierarchical vehicular / 
pedestrian circulation. The hierarchy was achieved in three ways. Firstly, by having major streets 
connecting the area; secondly, by having an internal street system between the blocks consisting of 
primary streets; and thirdly, by having bridges connecting the blocks to a pedestrian zone within each 
block.  
 
With Tito’s death in 1980, and the ensuing economic crisis resulting from increasing state indebtedness to 
the World Bank, the planning, use and decision making process concerning land developments of many 
unbuilt zones within designated Blocks also started changing despite the Modernist urban plan and 
imagining of New Belgrade literally not completed. This was seen in the private adaptation of public 
space, introduction of predominantly one-storey private commercial shops, and a somewhat gradual 
approach to selling state-owned apartments to their occupants. In the 1990s, with the violent 
disintegration of the SFRY, the United Nations Security Council imposed trade and travel embargoes on 
those Republics largely seen as responsible for the conflict, which in practice meant Serbia and 
Montenegro.26 In an attempt to deal with growing hyperinflation flowing from these measures, the state 
started to more rapidly sell apartments in New Belgrade.27 With this shift, an apartment was no longer a 
social right but a possession which also posed a shift in relation to time since time was now oriented 
towards earning in order to rent or own a property. The notion of common good was now headed 
towards individual survival. The war and the influx of refugees in the 1990s from Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina also affected commercial trade, including the scale and typology of buildings in New 
Belgrade. In terms of architecture, roof-terraces and balconies were often converted to provide rentable 
space for the newly arrived refugees. The building typology of New Belgrade started diversifying, at a 
time when social values were becoming more corrupt as a result of the political crises, nationalism and 
war.28 In relation to commerce, the crisis of war and international travel and economic embargos 
facilitated the introduction of wild markets such as New Belgrade’s Flea market (Buvljak). The Flea 
market sold goods (illegally) transported from countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania or even 
China. It is still in operation today, albeit significantly reduced, despite of or because of New Belgrade’s 
“vacant” blocks since 1999 being filled with shopping centres and private mixed-use buildings. This 
market is a signifier of New Belgrade’s polarised living, where shopping centres demonstrate a 
privileged consumer culture of want, and the Flea market demonstrating a disadvantaged socio-
economic layer in need to survive (refer to Figure 03). 
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NATO AND NEW BELGRADE: DE-SOCIALISATION THROUGH DE-HISTORISATION 
A string of events leading up to and during NATO’s 1999 Operation Allied Force might raise the 
question of the relation of this operation to the subsequent post-war redevelopment of New Belgrade.  In 
1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY – constituted of Serbia and Montenegro) was one of the 
last remaining countries in Europe resisting the shift toward consumer neo-liberalism; a shift first 
manifest with the fall of the Berlin Wall, followed by the disintegration of the USSR and the East Bloc, 
and then the breakup of the SFRY in the 1990s. On March 23, 1999, one day before NATO’s strikes began, 
then US President Clinton stated the importance of economic restructuring to the NATO intervention, 
claiming that if the US is 
 
going to have a strong economic relationship that includes our ability to sell around the world, Europe has 
got to be a key. And if we want people to share our burdens of leadership with all the problems that will 
inevitably crop up, Europe needs to be our partner. Now, that's what this Kosovo thing is all about.29 
 
The military analyst William M. Arkin (indirectly) re-affirms the noted restructuring in NATO’s 
targeting strategy: 
 
[w]hen Allied Force began, a variety of possible targets – including electricity, media facilities, and certain 
dual-use industries – were put off limits because they were largely ‘civilian’ targets. Yet it took all of a day 
or two before NATO governments began ‘escalating’ and considering them to be 
additional target categories. 30 
 
This targeting strategy was explicitly addressed in a 2002/03 thesis – Crony Attack. Strategic Attack’s Silver 
Bullet? – written by Julian H. Tolbert, a pilot who participated in NATO’s bombing campaign. According 
to Tolbert, ‘crony attack targets key elite supporters of an enemy leader to effect policy change in the 
attacker’s favor. It is also one of a set of tools used in coercive diplomacy. Other tools include economic 
sanctions and information operations.’31 If this is the case, then the 1993 travel and economic sanctions 
imposed on the FRY by the West may be seen in part a preparation for NATO’s 1999 Operation. The 
significance of economic restructuring can also be found in the proposed 1999 Rambouillet Agreement,32 
whereby one of the conditions NATO required FRY to accept was  ‘the use of airports, roads, rail and 
ports without payment of fees, duties, tolls or charge … (and the functioning of the) economy … in 
accordance with free market principles.’33 Here, the stipulation of ‘free market principles’ might be read in 
association with the NATO campaign’s targeting of an economy outside the neo-liberal order.  
 
The economic aspect in post-Cold wars is, according to Stephen Graham, a part of a ‘larger geo-economic 
scheme for engineering the urban machinations of control that are necessary to secure the triumph of 
neoliberal capitalism across the globe.’34 Often, the means of achieving this agenda is through a military 
strategy that Graham terms ‘de-modernisation’ and Eyal Weizman ‘design by destruction’. 35 Weizman 
writes that from the ‘political/military point of view, the city is a social/physical obstacle that must be 
reorganised before it can be controlled.’36 If one accepts Graham and Weizman’s thinking, then NATO’s 
intervention might be understood as an attempt to physically destroy and de-modernise cities by 
systematically paralysing all lines of communication in Serbia – military, economic, infrastructural, 
media and civilian. The re-building of destroyed buildings/infrastructure in cities such as Belgrade 
would then be dependent upon opening up Serbia to neo-liberalism and transforming the city and 
country according to free market principles. With the conditional nature of international bank loans, 
  
    7 
international control also results. The advancement of neo-liberalism might then be thought of as a covert 
or implicit aspect of NATO’s campaign of violence, whereby the attack on Belgrade not only immobilised 
the economic flows of the FRY, but also mobilised a relationship of dependence upon the West. The 
infrastructural and economic interests behind targeting Serbia and Belgrade may suggest that NATO’s 
campaign is connected to a whole theatre of violence (short-term being NATO’s 1999 Operation Allied 
Force, and long-term and indefinite being the current period of transition), where alternative systems 
that sustain the life of a city are destroyed in an attempt ‘to coerce resistant populations and political 
leaderships into surrender’.37 In order to overcome the effects of de-modernisation / design by 
destruction, the process of re-modernisation necessitates a form construction that benefits neo-liberalism 
and foreign bank loans. 
 
The importance of controlling and eliminating alternative social values and histories in relation to the 
SFRY/FRY context is suggested in an article written, during the NATO campaign, by the right-wing 
columnist of the New York Times, Thomas L. Friedman.38 In response to the public gatherings in Belgrade 
in 1999, which were used to voice protest against NATO’s campaign, Friedman wrote that ‘[i]t should be 
lights out in Belgrade: every power grid, water pipe, bridge, road and war-related factory has to be 
targeted. […] You want 1950? We can do 1950. You want 1389? We can do 1389 too.’39 Friedman’s 
comments, according to Stephen Graham, not only urge that ‘all the movements and mobilities 
sustaining urban life in Serbia should be brought to a grinding halt’, but also open the possibility that 
‘the precise reversal of time that the adversary society is to be bombed ‘back’ through is presumably a 
matter merely of the correct weapon and target selection.’40 Of the dates selected, 1950 is associated with 
the period of socialism in Belgrade (and Serbia). 1389 is significant as it marked the defeat of Serbia by 
the Ottomans (as well as the loss of Kosovo’s territory).  
 
The re-modernisation benefits the EU, the West and the market economy more than it does Belgrade and 
Serbia. In respect to Belgrade, the initial 78-day air offensive has been converted into an unnoticed, 
ongoing ground offensive, despite the Operation officially terminating on 10 June 1999. The 
(re)formation is seen in the privatisation of various telecommunications, construction firms, banks, 
power plants, refineries, and shipping concerns. This exposes the interconnection of military intervention 
and economic globalisation, with NATO’s Operation facilitating this reconnection, reorganisation and 
reterritorialisation. The attempt to map and code Belgrade’s space to suit military objectives finds a 
parallel in NATO’s 1973 plan by the Committee on the Challenge of Modern Society, ‘whose aim was to 
universally map out the circulation of persons and commodities’.41 Perhaps the most important claim made 
about the plan is that ‘the NATO plan aims at making entirely logistical that which, in the spatial 
continuum, was still divided between the civilian and the military.’42 This plan is now being put into 
operation, with the First Security Forum taking place in Belgrade in 2011 as part of building a broader 
understanding of the present and future security architecture of the EU. The idea is that civil and military 
relations become part of a larger reform involving ‘full cooperation with NATO and EU, as one of the 
main preconditions for SCG [sic. Serbia and Montenegro] joining the Euro-Atlantic community.’43 The re-
building and re-modernisation of Belgrade becomes the means by which to implement a “Western style” 
legal and economic system aimed at constraining and controlling the movement of people and resources. 
With the introduction of various (re)formation programs in the name of “security”, urban infrastructure 
becomes the means to seamlessly observe, circulate and extend violence and control.  
 
 
NEW BELGRADE: De-socialisation through De-historisation 
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After NATO’s 1999 de-modernisation of Belgrade, and in the ongoing transition period for New 
Belgrade, the city may be understood as being rapidly being re-modernised by being de-socialised. The 
socialist right to a residence and even the subsequent understanding of a residence as a possession are 
now being replaced with a new understanding: the residence as a commodity. Changes are also 
prominent in terms of public spaces where, through de-socialisation, these places are being turned into 
matter to be looked at rather than matter to be used. The tight relationship between de-socialisation 
through de-historisation is further apparent with the renaming of buildings (discussed later) and street 
names. For example, the ORA constructed Highway of Brotherhood and Unity, now known as the 
Boulevard of Arsenija Carnojevica and a key route to the Corridor X, has through renaming facilitated a 
symbolic erasure of a historically and socially unique aspect of its construction. 
 
New Belgrade’s transition aligns with the introduction of the first purported democratic government in 
2000, and the ensuing introduction of consumer neo-liberalism and the denationalisation laws whose 
governing notion is that public companies and buildings should be privatised. This change has affected 
land tenure laws such that 
 
[i]n 2003, after the new planning law adoption, the City remained the owner/user of the land only in New 
Belgrade, while locations in the old Belgrade are mainly in private use. […] Of the total of Belgrade’s 
building land allocated for long-term lease (250,000m2), only 31% was in New Belgrade in 2003. After the 
law changed, 84.57% of total 207.000m2 was leased in New Belgrade in 2004, 79.73% of 139.305m2 in 2005 
[...].44 
 
After 1999, with the advent of foreign loans, New Belgrade became one of the biggest construction sites 
in the Balkans. This resulted in the “gentrification of luxury high-rise buildings (primarily by new 
construction), while other blocks of lower quality [were] exposed to further downgrading in both 
physical and social terms.”45 The socialist building typology was diversified through polarisation and 
demarcation between neighbourhoods, where there was a discrepancy in aesthetic language and socio-
economic levels. The fragmented mix of new building types and old block-type buildings suggests that 
New Belgrade was coercively modulated by international, local and EU policies, with laws appropriated 
to suit a particular hegemonic agenda. In respect to Belgrade, this demarcation was perhaps 
demonstrated by conditions on both sides of the economic divide; that ‘most new buildings, including 
the dozens of Western-style malls and business complexes erected since 2000, serve primarily the upper-
middle and upper class of Belgrade’s society’ and ‘as of 2005 25,000 Belgrade residents lived in 29 slums 
and 64 other slum-like settlements that do not meet elementary health and sanitary standards.’46 This 
demarcated and economically-polarised patchwork presents New Belgrade as  
 
a city at war with itself, and its central zone is its main battlefield. Where the battle rages most vehemently 
is between a number of particular interests, now competing for supremacy and for the status of new, 
legitimate public interests. […] First and foremost, a clear demarcation line is in force between the era of 
social idealism, planning, and modernization, however imposed and hegemonistic its narrative was, and 
the new era driven by the forces of the market economy, privatization, and denigration of planning. [More 
so, it] is no more a no-man's-land, nor a common ground, but a land split by new boundaries.47  
 
 
The rapid reconfiguration of New Belgrade’s central axis and other blocks was mainly driven by 
international investment, foreign loans, contractual stipulations by the European Union, corrupt local 
Serbian politicians and their just as corrupt international clients. This is evident in Block 67 (refer to 
Figure 01), when in preparation for the 2007 Universiade Belgrade (25th World University Summer 
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Games), one of New Belgrade’s “vacant” blocks – Block 67 – was turned into an Olympic Village called 
Belville, with the intention that the numerous apartments in the Village would be sold after the event.48 
Whilst this practice has, unfortunately, become a common one in contemporary Olympic real-estate 
development (evident in both Beijing and London), what is specific to the context of Belville in Belgrade 
is that the evictions were directed towards a specific ethnic group of people – the Romani. The planning 
and construction of Belville exposes a shift from the SFRY model of owning property collectively, to 
treating property as a private commodity. Moreover, development of New Belgrade’s “vacant” block 
also resulted in relocating a considerable number of the Romani population to marginal areas of the city. 
This suggests that New Belgrade’s transition not only advanced de-socialisation, but also de-
Romanisation, whereby the two modes of spatial violence were intrinsically linked. Considering that 
‘planning is always political, serving political goals, and planners are agents of political programs,’49 the 
privatisation inherent in the reconstruction of New Belgrade was facilitated by rapid changes in land and 
company ownership and the law, whereby numerous companies that used to have their headquarters in 
New Belgrade were artificially bankrupted in order to be more easily privatised.50 The shift was geared 
towards a fairly smooth transfer from the norms of a once alternative socialist country to those of a global 
and foreign controlled neo-liberalist zone. The convergence of legal, governmental and military entities 
proceeded to the point where they became indistinguishable, perhaps indicating that NATO’s 1999 
campaign had an impact beyond the three-month bombing of Belgrade.  
 
De-socialisation was facilitated both directly through policy, and obliquely through culture. The policy 
driven de-socialisation has been made possible by the various loans provided by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The cultural de-socialisation has been evident in the creation of a 
new consumer culture, exemplified by newly created Serbian tycoons such as Miroslav Miskovic who 
among other capital ventures includes ownership of several shopping centres.51 One of these is Delta City 
Shopping Centre located next to Belville, and in Block 67. Hypo Adria Bank, the first private (neo-liberal) 
bank introduced to Serbia after the 1999 targeting, and Miskovic’s Delta Holdings funded Belville’s 
construction. Notably, during Slobodan Milosevic’s rule, some of the current tycoons were close 
supporters of the government, and therefore likely to be NATO crony targets. Presently, the old 
associations appear to have been forgotten as their power was directed towards accelerating neo-
liberalism through consumerism and privatisation. Seemingly, de-socialisation is contingent on 
producing a collective historical amnesia. After 1999, Belgrade and Serbia were highly receptive to a 
lifestyle dependent on international bank loans, accepting risks similar to that of the early 1980s when the 
SFRY experienced significant alteration to living standards as a result of the inflation driven by post 
WWII international bank loans. The noted risks have already materialised, with Serbia slowly losing its 
middle class, and two distinct classes emerging – the privileged and the underprivileged. 
 
Apart from the increased number of commercial properties, there has also been a change in appearance, 
use and (re)naming of particular buildings. For example, a building that was used as the headquarters of 
the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (also known as the CK Tower), and 
one of three significant government/cultural buildings in the post WWII formation of New Belgrade (the 
other two being the Federal Executive Council and the Museum of Contemporary Art), has been given a 
makeover. The 1962 – 1964 CK Tower (refer to Figure 01) was targeted during the 1999 strikes, and was 
one of the first renamed and reconstructed buildings, a process that lasted 3 years (2002 – 2005). Now 
occupied by private/commercial offices and known as the Usce Tower, the building is a signifier of the 
necessity to eliminate socialist history. The tower has had two more storeys added to its initial twenty-
three and used for purposes of hospitality and fitness,52 whilst the green-scaped public area surrounding 
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the building has been used for the construction of the new Usce Shopping Centre and a carpark that 
opened in 2009 (refer to Figure 04).53 It appears that green spaces that were once social have been turned 
into private and inactive pristine spaces to be viewed and consumed rather than used. Even the added 
storey within the tower, used for recreational purposes, plays a role in shaping and sculpting a once 
social(ist) body into a consumer one in order to fit a particular advertising “ideal” tied to urban spectacle 
and the consumption of leisure. An indication of a consumer culture of spectacle playing a prominent 
role is amplified with the re-clad glass façade of the USCE complex (tower and shopping centre) turned 
into a billboard of messages. At night the volume of the complex hauntingly disappears, apart from the 
array of spectacle manifested by neon light signs. The ultimate irony of the reconstruction is that a tower 
once associated with communism/socialism now boasts the sign of the first neo-liberal bank – Hypo 
Adria – introduced to Belgrade and Serbia after 1999.  
 
The global and political restructuring, where buildings and goods are becoming commodities for 
consumption and where residents are re-educated to believe in the necessity of consuming, underscores 
the proliferation of spatial violence. This form of spatial incursion is not as direct as the targeting of 
Belgrade in 1999 or the violence that occurred prior and during 1998-99 between Serbs and Albanians 
from the Province of Kosovo and Metohija. In New Belgrade, violence after 1999 has been more obscure, 
facilitated not only by international agencies, but also by local tycoons and corrupt government. Here, 
Zygmunt Bauman’s words find resonance, as the ‘state washes its hands of the vulnerability and 
uncertainty arising from the logic (or illogicality) of the free market, now redefined as a private affair, a 
matter for the individuals to deal and cope with by the resources in their private possession.’54 While 
fashion has driven a greater level of heterogeneity in New Belgrade’s current built landscape, it may still 
be understood as expressing an economic polarisation fiercer than in the preceding socialist context. 
Here, spatial violence may be understood as having transformed values, using consumerism as the 
conditioner of a “democratic” society despite this type of “democracy” being appropriated to suit narrow 
interests and depending upon short-term memory and a consumer culture of spectacle.  
 
 
BLOCKS 17 AND 18: DE-ROMANISATION THROUGH DE-HISTORISATION AND DE-SOCIALISATION 
De-Romanisation has been evident in the attempt to expunge the eclectic nature of zones in New 
Belgrade, and in particular the Romani settlements.55 The spatialisation of this violence has been 
reinforced through de-historisation and de-socialisation associated with negation of history of settlement 
and occupation; the Romani zones in New Belgrade’s history were whitewashed just as the residences 
occupied by other lower classes/disadvantaged peoples in Blocks 17 and 18 (refer to Figure 01).  
 
At their largest population and footprint in 2005, the Romani settlements in Block 18 were a bustling and 
rich patchwork of inhabitation with each Romani dwelling constructed of different materials; here, 
rubbish took on a new meaning and purpose as a valued and primary element of construction. Over the 
years, the settlements increased in size despite the lack of adequate infrastructure in terms of sanitation, 
sewage, electricity lines and pedestrian corridors. To address this problem would be the first step 
towards legalisation of these informal and illegal settlements,56 which is not in the interest of the Serbian 
government considering the prime position of this zone overlooking the river Sava.  
 
Besides this part of Block 18 exemplifying the type of Romani living not approved by the Serbian 
government (and more recently international agencies, to be explored below), the central importance of 
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these settlements is that they are located beneath the Gazela bridge (Gazela most), a major transport route 
that connects to both the West and the East via E75 (refer to Figure 05). Although visible to a passerby 
only from a distance via the bridge, the settlements occupied by the Romani provoke in that they expose 
normative expectations of how “civilised” and “respectable” people should live. They do not use the 
aesthetic approved by the West or the Serbian government. As they are located in the central zones of 
New Belgrade, rather than the fringes, the settlements are difficult to dismiss. They expose a normative 
limit, a signifier of a social and political cut of who can live in a city and how that city can be occupied. 
According to Bauman, the norm  
 
is the projection of the model of order upon human conduct. The norm tells what it means to behave in an 
orderly fashion in a well-ordered society; it translates, so to speak, the concept of order into the language 
of human choices. If any order is a choice, so is the norm; but the choice of a certain kind of order limits 
the choice of tolerable behavioural patterns. It privileges certain kinds of conduct as normal, while casting 
all other kinds as abnormal.57 
 
Expunging abnormality associated with the Romani differs from other forms in a long history of spatial 
violence through urban redevelopment and gentrification. Considering that the Romani have not had a 
fixed association with land, territory or a nation state, their very presence counters the grain of thinking 
that treats land as a commodity and a potential for economic surplus and political power, reinforcing a 
reminder that alternatives perhaps exist on how to think nation, national rights and legitimisation of land 
and territory. From this perspective, the presence of the Romani proffers a radical difference. That very 
little academic writing has been dedicated to the status of the Romani living in this New Belgrade zone 
since 1983 reinforces the hegemonic position.58 The relocation of the Romani – as the ultimate “outsiders” 
– to the fringes from this central location removes visibility and thinking to do with land, nation and 
national rights beyond what is currently accepted.  
 
In 2007, the European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
provided funding for the reconstruction of the structurally unstable Gazela bridge located above Block 18 
only on the condition that the people living underneath the bridge (the Romani) were moved and 
provided adequate housing.59 The necessity to relocate was underpinned by invoking the condition of 
security. The Belgrade city authorities  responded to this obligation by moving the Romani by force ‘to 
various provincial locations depending on their previous residential address.’60 Options included 
relocation to housing in tin shanties, with no provision for water or electricity. Needless to say that the 
sweltering summer months turned these dwellings into furnaces and the sub-zero winter months turned 
them into ice blocks. Ironically, whilst the presence of the Romani inhabiting the spaces below the Gazela 
bridge in Block 18 was perhaps welcome by Belgrade authorities during the 78-day NATO campaign in 
1999 as it saved the bridge from being targeted – just as it appears likely that the rock concert 
demonstrations staged on Branko’s Bridge during Operation Allied Force spared that bridge from 
destruction61 – their being there does not seem to be wanted by national or international bodies today. 
The EBRD’s pretext of security required during the reconstruction of the bridge was a cunning bid to 
“democratically” define how public space can be used and by whom. Given this invocation of the 
necessity for “security”, underpinned by international law, regulations and the neo-liberal agenda, the 
subsequent de-Romanisation can be compared to Weizman’s appraisal of the Palestinian settlements 
where   
 
[v]iolence becomes a necessary condition for the constant application of seemingly ad hoc but actually 
strategic security measures, and is the very justification for the suspension of state budgetary constraints 
  
    12 
and the allocation of massive funds for the purpose of security. The combination of security emergencies 
and economic recession during the early years of the second Intifada prepared the ground for the radical 
budget restructuring and the deep cuts in government spending (on all public projects but security) that 
typified the neo-liberal reforms promoted in 2002 by Minister of Finance Benjamin Netanyahu.62 
 
Since 2007, density of the Romani settlements has been significantly reduced, now occupying only the 
edge of Block 18 as in 1983. The 2007 resettlement of the Romani is only one example of violent evictions; 
being perhaps a precursor for the instatement of the City of Belgrade’s 2009 ‘Action Plan for the 
Resettlement of Shanty [Unhygienic] Settlements’.63 It seems that despite of or because of the 
historiographical absence of Romani voice, the violent nature of these evictions is becoming more 
frequent. In 2011, another 27 Romani families were force evicted from Block 61, a zone in close vicinity to 
the river Sava, in order to make space for a new commercial development.64 According to Amnesty 
International, this would be the first eviction of ‘Roma in Belgrade to be carried out on behalf of the 
government rather than the city authorities.’65  
 
Both Blocks 17 and 18 have a uniquely historical position in New Belgrade. Paradoxically, the urban 
proposals for New Belgrade have either treated Block 18 as an area that symbolically joins Old City with 
New Belgrade, or as a proposal that violently negates both the historical and current conditions. This is 
evident in the proposed 2021 Urban Plan of New Belgrade, prepared by the Urban Planning Institute of 
Belgrade,66 which shows an extreme transition from the leftist post WWII socialist conception of ‘space for 
all’ to a right-wing neo-liberal and private property-oriented ‘market for the few’.67 For Block 18, a new 
street network has been superimposed upon the Sava Amphitheatre, which has been imagined to 
connect Old and New Belgrade through the Gazela and the Old Railway Bridge. The proposed privatised 
mixed-use and high-rise complex is fragmented by a network of manicured pathways and landscaped 
grounds. The proposal treats Block 18 as a tabula rasa, despite this zone currently being comprised of 
private residences, small industries, artists’ studios, car markets, and a Romani community. Elimination 
of this heterogeneity would not only negate the contemporary nature of living and building, but also a 
historical aspect in that this zone is a unique example of rural-influenced houses in an urban context built 
in the 1930s. The site may be seen as a living archive that shows the transformation of a single-storey 
residential type over time, with changes influenced by fluctuating social and economic factors. Whilst the 
rest of Belgrade’s central zone was developed, this zone has evaded implementation of any rigorous 
planning visions, and in spite of or because of this, the area is a rich and a diverse source of ideas and 
approaches to building and aesthetics – including small workshops, auto mechanics and merchant spaces 
attached to and in extension from private family residences. 
 
On an adjoining block – Block 17 – a different kind of historical erasure is taking place. The 1937 
Fairground used so violently by the Nazis during WWII has been layered with more recent violence. 
Recent proposals include the conversion of the Fairground complex into a Holocaust memorial and 
museum.68 The adaptation of the complex into a Holocaust memorial and museum would ‘displace the 
local communities [associated with small industries, artists’ studios, car markets, small residences and a 
Romani community] that have made Staro Sajmiste [trans. the Old Fairground] their home and 
workplace, and in living there effectively protected the site from demolition and redevelopment.’69 The 
first evictees were forced out in 2013.70 The association of the Fairground only with a particular event 
reduces the meaning of other events, as well as other examples of violence that have occurred on this site 
and within these pavilions. This is not to disregard the immensity of scale and extreme nature of violence 
during the Holocaust, however, by associating the Fairground with only one violent event fixes history 
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to a frozen image; one that places measure and ordering on violence. It is the appearance that violence – 
both as an act and an outcome – is fixed and obvious matter that can be quantified and compared, 
whereby quantity becomes indicative of the immensity of violence. In this categorisation, violence begins 
to take on a hierarchy and symmetry, which further facilitates negation of other histories of violence. In 
other words, only violence that has been given the right to historical voice attains prominence, an 
ordering against which all other kinds of violence are measured against. Classification of violence 
prefigures a gauging on who can speak, and who needs to remain silent. Extensively, it eliminates the 
opportunity to question the strategy (how) and the intent (why) violence was spatialised beyond the voice 
that has been given the historical and hegemonic right to speak. Here, violence becomes pre-constituted 
thereby affixing the act and understanding of violence to a frozen image. If one is to accept this thinking, 
then it becomes plausible to reason that the 1999 incursion was only operative during the 78-day 





While we may interpret the history of New Belgrade – from a zone of delineation between the Occident 
and Orient to planning and construction after WWII – as impregnated with spatial violence, post-1999 
conditions are perhaps more dangerous in that they are less visible and more coercive. The violence may 
be understood as in-continuation, rather than new, with the Operation Allied Force being an example of 
military violence enacted in multiple modes: high-tech information operations (technology), neo-
liberalism (economy), de-modernisation (temporality), de-socialisation (social welfare), de-Romanisation 
(alternative values), and de-historisation (alternative histories). As such, the operations of the 1999 
campaign may be understood to have ranged between a high-intensity air campaign that lasted for 78 
days (March 24 – June 10) during which time architecture was destroyed, and cities – particularly 
Belgrade – de-modernised, and a longer-term and perhaps indefinite operation that is still taking place. It 
is a low-intensity and high-tech ground conflict facilitated by rapid changes to infrastructure, law, 
privatisation of companies, and transformation of territorial relationships; perhaps expanding the 
discipline and control associated with the 1999 Operation. Through a concatenation of modes of spatial 
violence, another has been facilitated; re-modernisation of New Belgrade is used to remove all difference 
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